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Abstract 
This article highlights concerns regarding judicial interpretations and understandings of the 
application of Article 8 European Convention on Human Rights to control the deportation of 
foreign criminals from the United Kingdom. It examines the broad scope of the provision 
arguing that it is somewhat unclear, vague and unpredictable for those seeking to rely on it. 
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Introduction 
Immigration control is a fundamental part of the governing of any country and due to the fact 
that the European Court of Human Rights (‘the Court’) has traditionally recognised that such 
control is essentially a matter of domestic policy, it affords each Contracting State a wide 
margin of appreciation in the way that control is implemented.2 Increasingly, immigration 
control is ‘linking the enjoyment of rights within their society to a person’s immigration 
status’.3 
 
Millions of people cross the British borders every year, but what controls are in place when 
one of those individuals commits a criminal offence? In the eyes of the reasonable man, any 
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person who commits a crime should be punished in a way that is proportionate. However, it 
is the opinion of the British Government in cases where the criminal in question is foreign, 
that some crimes will warrant deportation as the proportionate punishment. Immigration 
control and deportation are highly prevalent issues in the UK, and the symbiotic relationship 
between government-policy combined with a hostile media discourse with the capability to 
create an anti-immigration public, can lead to a misrepresentation of the application of Article 
8 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(‘the Convention’) that is in place to protect both the British public and those who face 
deportation.  
 
Under sections 3(5) and 3(6) of the Immigration Act 1971, as amended by paragraph 44 of 
Schedule 14 to the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, a person who is not a British citizen 
may be liable to deportation if the ‘Secretary of State deems his deportation to be conducive 
to the public good’.4 This is supported by the Immigration Rules which provide by rule 364, 
that ‘where a person is liable to deportation the presumption shall be that the public interest 
requires deportation’, and under section 32 of the United Kingdom Borders Act 2007 there is 
now a provision for the ‘automatic deportation’ of non-British citizens over the age of 17 who 
have been sentenced to more than 12 months in prison.5  
 
The question which must then be answered in order to balance this controversial 
punishment is what legal measures are in place to protect those people from deportation? 
Under section 33(2)(a) of the United Kingdom Borders Act 2007, there is an exception to the 
automatic deportation provision in situations where the removal of the foreign criminal would 
breach their Convention rights. After Article 3, Article 8 has been relied upon most often in 
deportation cases and sections 82(1), (2)(j-k) and 84 of the Nationality, Immigration and 
Asylum Act 2002 (as amended) offer a provision which allows a defendant to appeal their 
deportation order on the basis that the decision to grant the order is incompatible with the 
Convention.6 
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1 Private and Family Life under the ECHR 
In order to effectively evaluate the controversial debate over foreign criminals seeking to rely 
on Article 8 in order to avoid deportation, it is crucial to understand the interpretation of the 
words within the Article itself, specifically what is meant by ‘private and family life’. Article 8 is 
divided into two parts; Article 8(1) illustrates the rights which are to be guaranteed to an 
individual by the State and Article 8(2) makes it clear that the right is a qualified one and for 
that reason it may on occasion be acceptable for public authorities to interfere with those 
rights.  
 
Private Life 
With regard to the first element of Article 8 and the concept of a ‘private life’, it was stated in 
Costello – Roberts v United Kingdom (1995),7 that the idea of private life in itself is a broad 
concept incapable of an exhaustive definition, and it was explained that for this reason the 
courts must consider the concept on a case-by-case basis. This was acknowledged in the 
judgment of the case of Niemietz v Germany (1999),8 which confirmed that it was not 
possible or necessary to attempt a definition, but that the right to respect for private life 
should not be so restrictive as to deny the right to establish and develop relationships with 
the outside world or other human beings. 
 
More recently, in R (o/a Razgar) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (No.2) 
[2004],9 Article 8 was described as the protection of an individual’s moral and physical 
integrity and it is clear too from Pretty v United Kingdom (2002),10 that the idea of ‘private life’ 
also protects an individual’s right to personal development. 
 
Family Life 
In respect of the meaning of a ‘family life’ in the context of Article 8, a case-by-case 
approach must also be taken, but it has been established that the general rule is that close 
personal ties will constitute a ‘family life’. For example, the Court considers a ‘lawful and 
genuine’ marriage as automatically amounting to family life, as illustrated in Abdulaziz, 
Cabales and Balkandali v United Kingdom (1985).11 Relationships between a mother and 
her child will also automatically amount to family life, as established in Marckx v Belgium 
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(1979),12 as will the relationship between married parents and children, which was held in 
Berrehab v The Netherlands (1988).13 In the case of Beoku-Betts v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2008],14 the House of Lords also highlighted that under the anti-
discrimination provisions of Article 14 of the Convention, decisions as to the presence of a 
family life should not be influenced by the marital status of the parents and that the family 
should be considered as a whole. 
   
In Senthuran v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004],15 the Court of Appeal 
confirmed that where the requisite level of connection and dependency is present, family life 
may exist16 and crucially, in E-Jannath v ECO Dhaka [2002],17 the Tribunal highlighted the 
level of contact between family members as a consideration. However, it was also noted that 
certain events could break this presumption of a family tie such as long periods of time spent 
apart. Finally, an already wide and somewhat ambiguous definition is broadened further by 
the case of Keegan v Ireland (1994),18 in which it was established that the mere potential for 
family life may also be sufficient, which in itself is another vague concept. 
 
Once a private or family life has been established, the courts must decide whether the State 
would be breaching their negative duty to refrain from interference with that right by 
deporting the applicant, by contemplating four simple considerations. Firstly, whether there 
would be such interference; secondly, whether that interference is in accordance with the 
law; thirdly, whether any such interference is in the interests of one of the legitimate aims set 
out in Article 8(2) and fourthly, whether the means chosen are necessary in a democratic 
society.  
 
The first of these considerations does not cause too much difficulty in deportation cases, as 
to remove a person from their family is a clear interference with their life. Considering this on 
a broader scale, it is now clear that to remove somebody from situations such as their 
support network or distant family can also interfere with their life. However, in order to 
progress with the deportation process the Court must decide whether the upheaval caused 
by that deportation would be proportionate to the public interest which the removal is 
intended to serve. Due to the fact that the interference alleged in these situations usually 
arises from the application of statute or rules which tend to meet the criteria laid down in 
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Article 8(2), it is rare for an immigration provision not to be ‘in accordance with the law’ and 
therefore not meet the second consideration. 
 
The third consideration is whether such an interference is conducive to the public good, i.e. 
in the interest of one of the legitimate aims set out in Article 8(2); namely necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-
being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. These interests are 
exhaustive, not illustrative,19 and the State must identify one or more in order to successfully 
deport a person, as without a legitimate aim the interference with Article 8 will not be 
proportionate.  
 
This links to the fourth requirement which is, perhaps, the one which causes the most 
difficulty. This final consideration is a balancing exercise between the foreign criminal’s 
private interests and the general public interest in maintaining effective immigration control. 
In Huang and Kashmiri v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007],20 the House of 
Lords held that where there was interference with the right to family life, the question was 
whether that interference was sufficiently serious to be a breach of Article 8. In order to 
assess whether the interference is necessary in a democratic society, the characteristics 
may, according to the Court, include ‘broad-mindedness and willingness to tolerate ideas 
that shock or offend’,21 and necessity must be distinguished from reasonableness. It is the 
task of the Tribunal to ‘establish all the relevant facts and then weigh all that tells in favour of 
the [decision challenged], with particular reference to justification under Article 8(2).’22  
Controversially, it was stated by Lord Bingham that ‘Decisions taken pursuant to the lawful 
operation of immigration control will be proportionate in all save a small minority of 
exceptional cases’,23 which could lead to the assumption that the number of successful 
deportations significantly outweighs the successful appeals against deportation. However, 
this is not necessarily the case.  
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2 Whose Rights are They Anyway? 
Despite the claims published throughout the media, for example, the Sunday Telegraph 
report that ‘the right to family life... is now routinely used to prevent the Government from 
deporting dangerous criminals, including terrorists’,24  Ministry of Justice figures show that 
actually, in 2010, only 102 out of 850 appeals against deportation to the Immigration and 
Asylum Tribunal were successful.25 In evaluating cases which require consideration of Article 
8, as illustrated in Sezen v Netherlands (2006)26 the previous function of the decision maker 
in these situations, was to: ‘[Strike] a fair balance between…the applicant’s right to respect 
for their family life on the one hand, and the interests of public safety and the prevention of 
disorder and crime on the other’.27 This was developed by the Court of Appeal in Miao [2006] 
when it observed that: 28 
 
The assessment of proportionality is not a simple weighing of two cases against each 
other. It arises only when the claimant has established that he enjoys a protected 
right which is threatened with violation; at that point the burden shifts to the state to 
prove that the violation is nevertheless justified.29  
 
Under an amendment to the Immigration Rules, Part 13 now advises that where a person is 
liable to deportation, the presumption shall be that the public interest requires deportation, 
and it will only be in exceptional circumstances that the public interest will be outweighed in 
a case where it would not be contrary to the Convention;30 this is how the test for 
proportionately currently stands.  
 
The first example of a successful appeal against deportation - AA v United Kingdom 
(2011),31 illustrates this concept.  In 2002, a 15 year old Nigerian applicant was convicted of 
the rape of a 13 year old girl. A year later, the Home Office served him with a notice of 
liability to a deportation order on account of the conviction, which he appealed. The applicant 
complained that deportation would interfere with his rights under Article 8, but he was served 
with a deportation order in the following terms:  
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In the light of the seriousness of your criminal offence your removal from the [UK] is 
necessary in a democratic society…. [W]e consider that any interference with your 
family life is in your case outweighed by the public interest in preventing crime, and 
your removal is proportionate in pursuit of that aim under Article 8(2).32  
 
In this case the applicant accepted that the offence committed was indeed a serious one, but 
claimed that he had demonstrated remorse and it had been accepted that he posed a low-
risk of re-offending. He appealed the decision again during which the Judge highlighted the 
fact that because the applicant was young and had no dependence in respect of his family 
going beyond normal emotional ties, this did not amount to a ‘family life’. In contrast Maslov 
v Austria [2008]33 offers an illustration of a case in which the Court had accepted that the 
relationship between a young adult, who like AA was yet to found a family of his own, and 
their family members could constitute ‘family life’, which illustrates the first example of the 
inconsistency in applying Article 8. In AA he Judge did accept that the length of the 
applicant’s residence, the mere presence of family members in the country, and his 
attendance at church and at University did establish a private life, and reiterated that:  
The [Secretary of State’s] decision interferes with respect for that private life, in that 
he would be separated from his family and church… However, we also find that that 
the interference pursues the lawful aim of immigration control….34 
 
Despite this, the Court eventually made the decision that deportation would be 
disproportionate to the legitimate aim of the prevention of disorder and crime, and would 
therefore not be necessary in a democratic society. It would appear that on multiple 
occasions the various judges had accepted that despite the likely breach of the applicant’s 
Article 8 rights, the crime he had committed was so serious that they could be justified in 
interfering with that right, and yet the applicant was still successful because it was found that 
the decision to deport would interfere with the life he had created for himself, and would 
therefore be disproportionate to the public interest which might be served by his deportation.  
 
The second example involves another young victim, Amy Houston, a 12 year old girl who 
was killed by a hit and run driver in 2003.35 The driver was Mohammed Ibrahim, an Iraqi 
Kurd citizen whose application for asylum had been refused after arriving in the country 
clandestinely, concealed in the back of a lorry.36 Ibrahim had a criminal record and was 
driving a car in England despite not holding a driving licence. He had received numerous 
fines for driving offences and was disqualified from driving on two occasions before he killed 
Amy. Five years and a multitude of convictions later, the British Government ordered 
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Ibrahim’s deportation as a result of his persistent criminality. During this time, Ibrahim seized 
the opportunity to father two children with a British partner; the question which then arose 
was whether his right to respect for family life under Article 8 was a defence he could use to 
avoid deportation and the answer to this question was ‘yes’.37 It is apparent that the courts 
purported to protect Ibrahim’s children who would have had to have either moved to Iraq with 
him upon his removal or witness their family be separated. As Baroness Hale once pointed 
out, a child should not ‘be held responsible for the moral failures of either of his parents’.38 
And, as has previously been noted, the whole family unit must be considered when deciding 
whether a family life is present.  
 
This notion was further supported by Baroness Hale in ZH (Tanzania) v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department [2011],39 when she stated whilst referring to Article 3(1) United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 (‘UNCRC’) that there ‘Is a binding 
obligation in...our national law…the Secretary of State must… [have] regard to the need to 
safeguard and promote the welfare of children who are in the UK.’ She also acknowledged 
that the applicant had made the decision to have two children knowing that her immigration 
status was ‘precarious’,40 and the Tribunal stated that the applicant’s decision to have her 
second child was ‘demonstrably irresponsible.’41 This lack of responsibility is also clearly 
present in Ibrahim but it does not appear to have been a factor which was taken into account 
by the Court.  
 
Despite the Telegraph reporting that ‘Ibrahim’s specific claim to close-knit family life melts 
under scrutiny’ because amongst other claims, it was stated that he has ‘very limited ability 
in English’, it was ruled that he had developed a significant relationship with his step-children 
and that he was acting as their father. For this reason, the Court of Appeal held that Ibrahim 
would be able to stay in the country because to deport him would breach his ‘right to family 
life’.42 A variety of contentions were apparent in this particular case and in fact, the 
Designated Immigration Judge concluded that ‘there was much about the evidence which 
was unsatisfactory and contradictory’.43 But whatever the correct facts may have been Judge 
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McClure decided that the Government would not be proportionately justified in removing 
Ibrahim from the country. 
 
Another example of a case in which a convicted criminal successfully avoided deportation 
involved violent drug dealer Gary Ellis.44 Ellis came to Britain from Jamaica in 2001 on a 
visitor’s visa aged just 14 years old. He was later jailed for robbery and attempted robbery 
and three years later he was imprisoned again for supplying Class A drugs. In 2008, the 
Home Office attempted to deport Ellis but he brought the first of two Article 8 appeals and it 
was ruled that he should be allowed to remain in the country because he had established a 
family life with partner and child. The following year, Ellis was convicted once again of 
possession with intent to supply Class A drugs. This triggered the Home Office’s second 
attempt to deport Ellis. At this stage, it was found that Ellis was a ‘fully integrated member of 
British society’ with an ‘established family life with his partner, Miss Whiley, and their 
daughter’.45 Despite reports Ellis had in fact split from his partner in 2007 and had almost no 
contact with his child, the Court found that Ellis’ daughter’s ‘wellbeing was best promoted by 
allowing her to grow up in her own country, having a normal father-and-daughter 
relationship’.46 Ellis’ ex-partner has said that in fact she and Ellis were only together for 
around 18 months, any contact between them was by telephone, and that he has made little 
to no effort to financially support their daughter. As established in Singh v ECO-Delhi 
[2004]47 Article 8 protects the ‘potential’ for development of family life, thus the fact that the 
family life is ‘interrupted’ is not necessarily of primary relevance. The provision appears to be 
flexible, and for relationships which are yet to be firmly established as in situations involving 
young children, this flexibility is necessary.  
 
Conversely, 20,109 Class A drug-misusing individuals were identified during the period 1 
January to 31 March 2009 and this cohort subsequently committed 44,308 offences during 
the 12-month follow-up period.48 With such official statistics it is difficult to comprehend how 
it would not be in the public interest to remove a drug-offender such as Ellis from the 
country. It is suggested that the provision appears to have been used in its broadest sense 
in favour of Ellis. When the outcome of this case was revealed, Sir Andrew Green of 
MigrationWatchUK said, ‘It is very surprising that this claimant’s story was accepted at face 
                                                          
44
 Barrett, D., and Leach, B., ‘Jailed three times, but drug dealer deserves to stay in UK, say judges’, 
The Sunday Telegraph, 23 October 2011. 
45
 Ibid. 
46
 Ibid. 
47
 Singh v ECO-Delhi [2004] EWCA Civ 1075. 
48
 Home Office, ‘Drug-misusing offenders: results from the 2009 cohort for England and Wales’, 
(2010), http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-
statistics/police-research/misc0410/, (accessed 14 April 2012) at p.6. 
 
 Plymouth Law and Criminal Justice Review (2013) 1 
140 
 
 
value and it makes one wonder how many similar cases there have been’.49 This illustrates 
the difficulty which both the judiciary as the decision-maker and Parliament as the law-maker 
must face in the impossible task of developing legislation which successfully balances the 
rights of the applicant against the need to protect the British public. 
 
In AW Khan v United Kingdom (2010)50 a Pakistani national came to Britain in 1978 aged 3 
years old. In 2003, he was convicted for the third time for an attempted involvement in the 
importation of Class A drugs.51  He was sentenced to seven years imprisonment but was 
released just three years later. One month after his release the Secretary of State made a 
deportation order against him, concluding that his removal from the UK would be necessary 
in a democratic society. The applicant subsequently lodged an appeal, stating that his 
removal would be disproportionate as he cared for his mother and siblings, all of whom were 
in poor health. The Judge dismissed the appeal and agreed that the applicant’s deportation 
would be conducive to the public good finding that the applicant’s ‘family life’ did not go 
beyond the natural ties of affection. He noted, in particular, that his family whom he had 
claimed he solely cared for, managed to cope without him whilst he was serving his 
sentence, and that as illustrated in the case of Slivenko v Latvia (2003)52 there will be no 
family life between parents and adult children unless they can demonstrate additional 
elements of dependence. Two years after the original decision was made, the applicant was 
still in the country and was submitting fresh claims to the Home Office. In April 2009, the 
applicant advised the Court that his girlfriend had given birth and submitted a birth certificate, 
which named him as the father.  
 
The Government had accepted that Khan’s deportation would interfere with his rights under 
Article 8 due to the de facto family ties between himself and his girlfriend and daughter. The 
deportation order was, of course, in accordance with the law, and it is not disputed that the 
aim it intended to serve was legitimate. Therefore, the question which had to be answered in 
his final appeal was whether that interference was ‘necessary in a democratic society’. The 
Court reiterated the fact that the applicant’s offence was especially serious as it involved the 
importation of a large quantity of Class A drugs and in view of ‘the devastating effect of 
drugs on people’s lives, it [understood] why the authorities show great firmness with regard 
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to those who actively contribute to the spread of this scourge’.53 The Court decided that 
despite all of the above decisions regarding the applicant’s (lack of) private life, and that no 
decisive weight could be attached to the family relationship he held with his girlfriend, 
deportation would not be proportionate54 and would violate Article 8. 
 
The rules which relate to the powers to deport are contained in the Immigration Rules55 
supplemented by Chapter 13 of the Immigration Directorates Instructions (IDIs). These rules 
do not define a specific period after which revocation of a deportation order will be 
appropriate, although they do offer guidelines. In relation to cases involving foreign criminals, 
the typical course of action is to grant revocation applications where the original decision to 
deport was based on a conviction which is now ‘spent’ under section 7(3) Rehabilitation of 
Offenders Act 1974.56 However, paragraph 391 of the Rules highlights that where the 
applicant’s criminal record is serious, exclusion should continue for a ‘long term of years’. 
Annex A to Chapter 13 expands this by stating that revocation would not usually be 
appropriate until at least 10 years after departure for those who have been convicted of 
serious offences such as violence against the person, sexual offences, robbery or theft, and 
other offences such as drug trafficking.57 
 
It has already been established that Khan had a serious criminal record as a result of 
committing crimes including those listed above. One would assume that he should be 
deported and that exclusion should last until at least 10 years after the departure. However, 
Khan was not deported following the first decision and remained in the country for a further 
two years whilst fathering a child with a British Citizen. This highlights a clear problem, not 
necessarily with the legislation which appears to have initially been used correctly, but with 
the process of enforcement. Had this criminal’s deportation been enforced when it was 
initially ordered or even following the dismissed appeals, he would not have been able to 
establish a private and family life.  As evidence of this concern, Damien Green stated whilst 
answering an emergency question about foreign criminals at the end of last year, that there 
are ‘3,940 foreign criminals awaiting deportation who are not currently being detained’.58 
 
In contrast to the above examples, the crime committed in the next case was not so serious -
the defendant was arrested on suspicion of theft of £74 worth of goods from 
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 Debenhams but nonetheless potentially warrants the offender’s deportation.  
 
‘Teresa May’s Deportation Cat Flap’59 
The now somewhat infamous Camilo Soria Avila came to Britain in 2002 but remained in the 
country illegally for a further two years following the expiration of his visa. He was arrested in 
2007 on suspicion of theft but was never charged. The Home Office said he should be sent 
back to Bolivia, Avila  appealed and it was decided that he had in fact established a family 
life in the country, which included the acquisition of a cat and which subsequently sparked a 
great deal of media attention. When compared with those above, this case is a clear 
example of an individual who has established a private and family life prior to committing the 
crime. Avila’s lawyer said ‘As part of [the] application and as part of the appeal, the couple 
detailed statements of the life they had built together in the UK to show the genuine nature 
and duration of their relationship,’60 which the other examples do not appear to have been 
able to provide. Whether or not Avila was charged with the offence, common sense prevails 
in suggesting that there is little threat that his presence was not conducive to the public 
good,61 and certainly not a threat to which the proportionate response would be to deport 
him. 
 
It is clear that in deportation cases which involve potential breaches of the fundamental right 
protected by Article 8, the ultimate question which must be answered is whether the 
deportation prejudices the family life of the applicant in a way which is so sufficiently serious 
that it amounts to a breach of Article 8. If the answer is yes then the deportation is unlawful. 
However, it is evidently difficult to know precisely which of the cases are genuine and which 
are not, without immigration officers physically spending a period of time with the applicant, 
which would of course be expensive and impractical. In the meantime, the officers are 
offered 63 pages of guidance62 from the Home Office to assist them in considering claims 
and assessing credibility. Whether the specific details offered about the relationships which 
constitute these ‘family lives’ are in fact genuine or elaborated, there is a suggestion that the 
decisions should be made with ordinary common sense, compassion and decency in respect 
of keeping any family together because whether a person has a family life or not is a 
question of fact.  
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On the face of it so far, there may rarely be a case where removal of a foreign criminal will 
be allowed if there is a child involved, because the child’s interests will always be considered 
more highly than other factors which must be considered. The perceived importance of 
children in these cases was illustrated by the Supreme Court in ZH (Tanzania) v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department [2011]63 when it was stated that ‘there is an obvious tension 
between the need to maintain a proper and efficient system of immigration control and the 
principle that, where children are involved, the best interests of the children must be a 
primary consideration.’64 
 
3 Rights Gone Wrong 
The media depiction of this issue creates quite a cloud of inaccuracy which can cause 
misunderstanding about the use of Article 8 in immigration cases. It must be remembered 
that although the Convention does not guarantee foreign criminals a right not to be deported 
from the country, the European Court of Human Rights has held that any decision made to 
deport an individual which interferes with their rights under Article 8 must be justified as a 
proportionate response to a ‘pressing social need in that State.’65 
  
The first example in which the interference with Article 8 has been justified by the 
Government is that of JO (Uganda) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010].66 
The applicant came to the UK from Uganda aged approximately 4 years old. In 2002, he was 
convicted on numerous occasions of possession of Class A drugs with intent to supply and 
of possessing a prohibited weapon. He served a sentence in a young offender’s institution 
before being arrested again in 2005 for offences of possession of a firearm and prohibited 
ammunition. In 2008, the Secretary of State made a deportation order against the applicant. 
Richard LJ referred to a number of cases when deciding whether breaching the applicant’s 
rights under Article 8 by deporting him was proportionate. He referred to the case of Uner v 
The Netherlands (2007)67 in which it was decided that the deportation of a Turkish national 
following his conviction for manslaughter and assault was proportionate, and to Grant v 
United Kingdom (2009)68 in which the deportation of a Jamaican national who had 
committed numerous criminal offences (mostly non-violent), was proportionate. These 
examples illustrate two cases in which the severity of the crimes committed are almost at 
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opposite ends of the criminal spectrum and yet it was found that deportation was 
proportionate in both circumstances. This highlights one more inconsistency with the 
application of the provision. 
  
In the current case of Gurung v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012]69 the 
Home Secretary has been granted leave to appeal a decision of the Upper Tribunal which 
held that the deportation of Gurung would interfere with his family life. Gurung arrived in the 
country in 2005 and shortly afterwards was involved in a group attack which led to a man’s 
death. The defendant was tried and convicted of manslaughter and was therefore subject to 
automatic deportation. However, the Upper Tribunal found that this automatic deportation 
would be a disproportionate interference with his Article 8 rights. Whilst making this decision, 
the Tribunal considered the nature of Gurung’s offence and suggested that it did not justify 
the interference. The Upper Tribunal concluded that: 
The regime of automatic deportation…deserves respect requires a very careful 
consideration of the seriousness of the offence and the extent to which the 
deportation can be said to enhance public protection on the one hand and the impact  
upon private and family life on the other.70 
 
If this is the case, then one might question how criminals such as Ibrahim above, who can 
commit a crime so serious that it leads to a death, can avoid deportation when the 
seriousness of the offence is taken into ‘careful consideration’.  
 
In the case of Samaroo v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001]71 the applicant, 
a national of Guyana, arrived in the UK in 1988 on a six-month visitor’s visa. Three months 
into his visit he married a woman who had acquired British Citizenship. In 1990, the 
applicant was granted indefinite leave to remain as a foreign spouse and one year later a 
son was born into the marriage. In 1994, the applicant was convicted of ‘being knowingly 
concerned with the importation of four kilograms of cocaine worth approximately £450,000.’72 
He received a 13 year sentence, during which the Secretary of State made a deportation 
order which the applicant appealed. In 1999, the applicant applied for exceptional leave to 
remain in the UK on grounds including the fact that he had close family ties here. In 2000, 
the application was refused because the factors identified which included the applicant’s 
marriage, his wife’s immigration status in the UK,  their child and so on were of much weight 
but, ‘In light of the seriousness and nature of the offence the Secretary of State [did] not 
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accept that it would be in the public interest to permit [the applicant] to benefit from the 
exercise of his discretion’.73  
 
In this case, Mr Still, a senior caseworker in the Immigration and Nationality Directorate 
submitted a witness statement stating that ‘the Secretary of State regarded…drug related 
offences as “particularly serious and harmful to society”’74 and that ‘as a matter of general 
policy, the Secretary of State does not tolerate the continued presence in this country of 
those convicted...’75 When this case is compared to Ellis above, it is once again difficult to 
see the consistency in the application of the provision. Although it is accepted that each case 
must be considered individually, when two cases are presented with very similar facts, it is 
impossible to understand how the deportation of one applicant is ‘necessary in the interests 
of a democratic society’, but not in the case of the other.   
 
In N (Kenya) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004]76 the applicant came to 
the UK aged 20 as a visitor. He was refused leave to enter the country which led to his 
application for asylum and temporary admission to the country. He subsequently had two 
children with a Dominican citizen living in the country. One year later, the applicant was 
convicted of abduction, threats to kill, false imprisonment of a woman and three counts of 
rape. It was concluded by the Judge that the appellant was a danger to the public.  Whilst in 
prison he was initially refused asylum, but in 1999 he was later held to be a refugee. He 
married his wife whilst in prison but in 2002, the Secretary of State then made a decision to 
deport him. The applicant argued that the deportation would breach his Article 8 rights but 
the Secretary of State ‘carefully balanced [his] personal and domestic circumstances against 
the seriousness of [his] crime and the need to protect the wider community’, and found that it 
was appropriate to deport him.77 The Court of Appeal upheld the deportation order because 
the ‘public interest side of the balance has to include the public policy need to deter and 
express revulsion at the seriousness of the criminality’.78  Once again, an inconsistency is 
apparent; in this case the rape of a woman was repulsive, but the rape of the 13 year old girl 
in the case of AA does not appear to have been held with the same distaste, ultimately 
affecting the outcome of the case.  
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It is clear that not all foreign criminals are simply allowed to stay in the country because they 
have established a private and family life. What is not always clear is the reason why some 
appeals are granted and some are not. It was acknowledged in the case of AP (Trinidad and 
Tobago) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011]79 that since the UK Borders 
Act 2007 came into force, ‘greater weight was to be given to [policy factors in favour of 
deportation]’,80 and some of the examples above illustrate this. It could be suggested that 
that there are strong policy related trends in these situations and due to the lack of 
prescribed considerations to be taken into account, different elements appear to be given 
different weight, depending upon issues of public policy prevalent at that time, depending 
upon the opinions of the Judges hearing the case. Even in cases where the facts are almost 
identical but the attitudes of the Judges differ, the cases can have drastically different 
outcomes, which once again highlights the dangerous unpredictability of the application of 
this Convention right.    
 
Conclusion  
Article 8 does not remove the power of a State to deport a person if they have been 
convicted of a criminal offence.81 In fact, the law is in place to ensure that decisions made to 
deport such a person are lawful, necessary and proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued.82 However, the wide margin of appreciation afforded by the Court makes it 
impossible to anticipate any principles which might assist in the application of Article 8, and it 
can be suggested that the Court has failed to lay down exhaustive criteria for the balancing 
exercise which must be undertaken when assessing whether interference with Article 8 is 
proportionate. The confusion this has generated has subjected the Court to much criticism.83 
For example, Judge Pettiti in Boughanemi (1996)84 referred to the case-by-case approach as 
‘A lottery for national authorities and a source of embarrassment for the Court’.85 
 
It is evident that the Court has to strike a balance between ensuring that there is enough 
flexibility to deal with any circumstance which may arise whilst ensuring that the principles 
are sufficiently certain in order to assist the authorities. They must do this whilst ensuring the 
principles remain clear and accessible to allow affected individuals to be able to foresee the 
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consequence of their decisions. In evaluation of some of the contrasting outcomes in the 
cases referred to, it is difficult to see how a foreign person who commits a crime involving 
Class A drugs, for example, may be able to foresee the consequence of their actions when 
some of the cases involving those crimes result in deportation and some of them do not, 
even when the private and family lives of those involved are not so different. Conversely, any 
attempt to place these principles of law in an exhaustive list would be virtually impossible; 
mainly because what may be regarded as a threat to public order may differ between the 
Contracting States. The restriction would also take away the Convention’s ability as a ‘living 
instrument’ to adapt to constant social change.86 
  
Another problem is the lack of definition of the rights themselves as the Court has opted for 
an ‘amalgam of legal, social and biological criteria for evaluating the existence of a family 
relationship’.87 The examples discussed also highlight the courts’ attitudes towards children 
in these situations suggesting a hierarchy of such relationships which would imply that not all 
applicants are in an equal position. This lack of definition has led to questioning about 
whether or not the notion of private and family life has ‘any inherent value’,88 and Thomson 
has even described privacy as a ‘parasitic interest which derives its value from more 
fundamental entitlements’.89 In reality, privacy is a ‘heterogeneous prerogative’,90 the 
contours of which can only be determined when it is subjected to challenge, which makes 
this area of law uncertain and which supports the criticism that Article 8 is one of the most 
open-ended provisions of the Convention.  
 
Despite this lack of clarity and the exaggerated media depiction of the issue,91 the 
Commission has reiterated on occasions that Article 8 does not ‘confer on an alien the right 
not to be expelled from a country of which he was not a national’.92 But the Court can only 
start from the overarching objective that each State has to protect their public order and 
prevent crime, which if necessary may involve expelling non-nationals who have committed 
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criminal offences. Establishing how genuine a claim might be is a difficult task, when 
referring to the credibility of claims, Tony Blair commented in his memoir that ‘most claims 
were not genuine. Disproving them, however, was almost impossible’.93  It should also be 
noted that the politicians’ common idea of the ‘abused’ asylum system is in reality a much 
more complex system than they might understand. In support of Blair’s statement, it was 
suggested by the Committee that ‘there is a tendency among some people to assert [their 
rights] promiscuously and that devalues them’.94 This is something which the proposed Bill of 
Rights would hope to address according to the Human Rights Minister when questioned on 
this issue that  
‘The majority of the British people feel these rights somehow privilege unfairly certain 
groups of people and they are encouraged to do so by people who claim, often… 
without any justification whatsoever’95.  
 
It is often difficult to disagree with this statement when Judges are increasingly broadening 
the scope of Article 8 but at the same time failing to consider the same rights of the victims. 
It is not necessarily a case of choosing the rights of the British over the rights of a foreign 
person, but choosing the rights of the victim over the rights of the criminal. In any case, 
should there even have to be a ‘choice’ between one and the other? There is also an 
argument suggesting that the problems lie less with the Article, but with its enforcement. It 
Had Ibrahim been removed from the country when his application for asylum failed then he 
would not have had the opportunity to kill a young girl. In fact, it was stated in that case that 
‘the reason he [had] become entitled [was] the Secretary of State’s delay in making a lawful 
decision in relation to his removal’.96 In support of this, it was famously stated by former 
Home Secretary, John Reid, that the Home Office was ‘not fit for purpose’,97 and it has even 
been described as ‘the most hazardous department in government’.98  If this is in fact the 
case, then perhaps the focus should be on improving the mechanisms by which those who 
should be deported, are deported within a particular timeframe.  
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Misleading allegations have prevented honest debate on the topic and it should be noted  
that Article 8 is also engaged in situations involving British Citizens. For example, the High 
Court has recently ruled that female prisoners should be allowed time out of jail to see their 
children. This supports the notion that perhaps instead of relying on ‘abstract legal criteria’99 
cases should be decided on a practical common-sense basis, that a family life should be 
respected no matter what the circumstance.  However, if this notion was legislated upon, it 
could lead to an opening of the floodgates for an unmanageable caseload in a supranational 
authority100 that is already described as an ‘overburdened beast’,101 and with that would 
come the potential for further abuse of the law.  
 
It is clear that for any Contracting State, it is vital to know exactly what its obligations are 
under the Convention and this is especially true of Article 8 for which there is no ready-made 
definition. In cases involving the deportation of foreign criminals, Article 8 is nothing if not 
uncertain, unpredictable, ill-defined and amorphous,102 and this may suggest that it is an 
inadequate basis for appeals against deportation. 
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